Space Sovereignty for Smaller Nations: Why Strategic Indispensability May Matter More Than Autonomy

Space sovereignty is usually understood as a country's ability to control or independently access the space capabilities it considers strategically important. Full-stack space sovereignty takes this further: a country seeks to develop or control the entire chain - from launch and satellites to communications, ground infrastructure, data, navigation and space-domain awareness.

For major space powers, this ambition can be justified by scale, security requirements and strategic competition. For smaller nations, however, attempting to replicate the entire space stack can be economically inefficient and strategically unnecessary. 

The more interesting question is therefore - “Which capability can we own, master or host that others cannot easily replace?” 

This is where a different model of sovereignty is emerging: selective sovereignty through strategic interdependence.

From full sovereignty to selective sovereignty 

Full-stack sovereignty seeks to control most or all critical layers of the national space architecture, while selective sovereignty concentrates resources on a smaller number of strategically important capabilities - areas where a country has a geographic, technological, institutional or industrial advantage. 

The second model does not mean giving up sovereignty. It means being selective about where sovereignty creates the greatest strategic return.

The capability could be: 

• secure satellite communications;

• a strategically located ground station;

• space-domain awareness infrastructure;

• a launch site;

• specialised space manufacturing;

• optical communications expertise;

• a unique geographic location;

• regulatory or institutional capabilities; or

• access to infrastructure that is difficult to replicate elsewhere.

While the capabilities and technologies may differ, the underlying principle is the same – a smaller nation does not need to own the whole system if it occupies a position in the system that others depend on.

Several countries are already demonstrating elements of this approach

Luxembourg: sovereign capability through partnership

Luxembourg provides an example of how a small country can build strategic space capability without attempting to recreate a vertically integrated space industry. 

Through GovSat, a public-private partnership between the Luxembourg Government and SES, the country established a dedicated capability for secure government and defence satellite communications. GovSat-1 has supported Luxembourg as well as EU and NATO users, while Luxembourg has retained sovereign oversight of the capability. 

Luxembourg is also developing GovSat-2, a second military communications satellite, planned for launch in 2029. The project is explicitly positioned as a contribution to collective security while generating strategic and economic value for Luxembourg. 

Norway: turning geography into strategic infrastructure 

Norway demonstrates a different route. Its advantage is not simply technology, but geography. 

At 78° north, SvalSat on Svalbard provides exceptional access to polar and sun-synchronous satellite orbits. Operated by Kongsberg Satellite Services (KSAT), it is recognised as one of the world's most strategically positioned polar ground stations, with access to every orbit for spacecraft in relevant polar orbits. 

Norway did not need to control the satellites passing overhead. It built infrastructure that those satellites need. 

New Zealand: strategic relevance through launch infrastructure 

On the Māhia Peninsula, Rocket Lab operates Launch Complex 1, described by Rocket Lab as the world's only private orbital launch range. The site was developed specifically to provide frequent access to orbit and has become the launch site for Electron missions. 

This is important because New Zealand enabled a globally significant private launch capability on its territory, thereby becoming part of the infrastructure through which other countries, companies and satellite operators access space. 

Australia: sovereignty through strategic location and allied infrastructure 

Australia demonstrates yet another model: becoming strategically valuable by hosting critical space-domain-awareness infrastructure. 

The Space Surveillance Telescope at Exmouth, Western Australia, is operated through a US-Australian partnership and contributes to the broader Space Surveillance Network. Its location provides valuable coverage of the southern hemisphere and deep-space objects. Australia is responsible for the facilities, operators and training, while US retains ownership of the telescope. 

The result is a form of shared sovereignty: the capability is embedded within an international network, while Australia gains strategic access, expertise and relevance. 

Japan: sovereignty through technology that connects the system 

Japan illustrates a fourth route: technological specialisation. 

JAXA and NEC demonstrated a 1.8 Gbps optical inter-satellite communication link between the ALOS-4 Earth-observation satellite and a geostationary optical data-relay satellite around 40,000 km away. The system successfully transmitted large volumes of EO data to the ground through the relay satellite. 

The strategic significance extends beyond the demonstration itself. OISL can change how EO data moves through space - reducing dependence on individual satellite-to-ground contact windows and enabling high-volume data transmission through relay architectures. 

For emerging space economies, this points towards a different model of capability development. A country does not necessarily need to own every satellite, ground station and relay asset. It may instead develop a critical technology or integration capability that becomes part of the wider architecture.

From autonomy to indispensability

For smaller and emerging nations, the future of national space strategy may therefore not be defined by how much of the space stack a country owns. It may be defined by how difficult it would be for its partners to operate without the capability that country provides. 

And as the space race intensifies, the ability to occupy a strategically valuable position within a larger ecosystem would become as important as the ability to operate independently. 

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